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There is no consensual definition of intelligence. For some, it is the ability to acquire and apply 
knowledge, and in biology it is broadly formulated as an organism’s ability to adapt to its environment. 
When it comes to details, further criteria are often added, such as self-awareness, abstract reasoning 
and learning, planning and creativity. 
The addition of these elements typically occurs to place a dividing line between us, humans, as 
intelligent beings, and animals who are somehow different – even though it is blatantly obvious that 
they are but differently intelligent. They may be overall less intelligent by certain measures, and yet 
they may be actually more intelligent in specific areas. Migratory animals have superior spatial 
cognition. Dogs have a fantastic sense of smell. Animals’ innovative use of tools was recently amply 
demonstrated by a sea lion, captured on video footage, using an octopus to slap a kayaker in the face.1  
In other areas, animals are not lagging so far behind as some imagine. It seems that even pigeons may 
experience cognitive dissonance.2 Rhesus monkeys showed observational learning based on 
witnessing the conditioned fear reactions of their fellow cellmates in a famous (albeit somewhat 
unsatisfying) 1967 experiment.3 Many more random examples could be offered, but ultimately the 
question shall be asked: Why are all of the above-listed manifestations of intelligence required, all at 
once, for us to call an organism intelligent? 
This might carry relevance for a magazine issue looking at „smart” technologies and tools of all kinds. 
If we are ready to deem a phone smart, and to regard algorithmically learning software as artificial 
intelligence, why would we stop short of referring to all living organisms as intelligent, even as they 
are intelligent to different degrees and in distinct ways? 
We often think of artificial intelligence as something to be constructed in the form of hardware and 
software. In fact, the field of synthetic biology is where practitioners are by rule involved in creating 
partly or fully artificial, intelligent entities. 
Call it another way of reaching technological singularity (or artificial superintelligence) if you wish, 
especially keeping in mind that organic and inorganic intelligence can be combined. Having considered 
this, the issue becomes not whether biological can be smart, but how synthetic biology masters the 
kind of smart that is biological. As Emily Leproust, CEO of the firm Twist Biotechnical puts it: “The last 
century was about computers, and now we are entering an era of biology.”4 
For the interest of historians: the choice of any milestone development to mark the beginning of this 
era of synthetic biology is bound to be arbitrary by nature, but a useful reference point may be 2004. 
That is when M.I.T.’s “Synthetic Biology 1.0” conference, the first annual worldwide convention of 
synthetic biologists, was held in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Otherwise, people have sought to manipulate biology since a very long time. Ever since the beginning 
of animal-breeding and plant cultivation, in fact. Humanity worked to perfect plant and animal species 
for its needs, through selection, generation by generation, and through cross-breeding. This may have 
been the beginning of the real Anthropocene, transforming much of the biomass that surrounds us, 
globally. Animals have since been cloned, from mice (in 1986) to macaques (2017). The history of 
animals and plants genetically modified in laboratories begins in 1974 and 1983, respectively. 
Genome-altering has become much easier by today, with the availability of technologies such as 
CRISPR/Cas9. Already before the millennium, viral vectors (retroviruses) have been used to insert 
functional genes into the DNA of children suffering from a fatal genetic disorder called X-linked SCID, 
successfully correcting the disease phenotype in a number of cases.5 Jellyfish and coral genes have 
been combined into other organisms’ DNA through recombinant DNA technology (rDNA), from mice 
to chicken, rabbits and pigs, to add the trait of bioluminescence (glowing in the dark) to individuals of 
these species. CRISPR/Cas9 is used for genome editing since 2015. 
Researchers using the latter technology on animal subjects can learn more about the effects of changes 
to the genetic code of organisms, allowing them to model disease emergence connected to its specific 
genetic sources, and eventually to reverse the process by targeting human pluripotent stem cells – 
possibly embryonic stem cells, but also induced pluripotent stem cell cultures in a lab, for example to 
grow a specific organ that is free of disease. CRISPR/Cas9 has even been used to edit out viruses 
integrated into human cell DNA.6 
There is a practically endless number of possible uses of genome editing. For example, for researchers 
who find studying bioluminescent chicken embryos (more convenient to study than mammal/human 
embryos in the first place) easier as a result. But bioluminescent plants and animals may be bred for a 
host of other reasons, too, such as to make a point in the form of art, as Eduardo Kac tried with the 
bunny Alba, a green-fluorescent rabbit glowing under blue light, created for him in a French laboratory, 
back in 2000.7 Such creatures may also be bred for the pleasure of a pet-owner with quirky 
preferences. 
And it is not just DNA that can be synthesised, but other complex molecules, too. Proteins. The cell-
free synthesis of even unnatural amino acids is possible.8 We are now at a point where the creation of 
unnatural molecules, cells and even organisms, as well as the re-creation of extinct species and the 
synthesising of full genomes based on computer data, is happening. Take the example of Mycoplasma 
laboratorium, a laboratory-engineered bacterium species, derived in 2007 from the natural 
Mycoplasma genitalium (the original bacterial DNA was simplified considerably and inserted into 
another bacterium species’ cell whose DNA had been removed before this). In the future, B2D2B 
converters, that is, biological-to-digital-to-biological converters, may make it possible to quickly upload 
and download as well as to print out organic molecules between two connected nodes in cyberspace.9  
Synthetic biology opens up fantastic possibilities for humanity. In fact, the question may be not how 
much we may need the achievements of this field, but how we could even hope to survive without 
these in the future. 
For instance, processes of globalisation and climate change help lethal disease-spreading mosquito 
species, such as Aedes aegypti, make a home for themselves in an increasing area on all continents, 
bringing malaria, Dengue fever, the West Nile virus, and other pathogens closer to everyone – 
especially with human mobility in mind. Areas on Europe’s peripheries have been gradually colonised 
by Aedes aegypti, such as Madeira or the Caucasus, while in the Netherlands these mosquitoes have 
recently also been imported related to human activities.10 The release of steriles mosquitoes, 
genetically manipulated as such, will be an important part of the necessary response. 
In another, even more important example of the kind of challenges now faced, a growing human 
population on planet Earth may only be sustained thanks to the continuation of the agricultural 
revolution, partly through genome-editing, to increase crop yields as well as plants’ resistance against 
pests and pathogens. The world economy’s fuel needs are also supported through genetically modified 
algae.  
All of this carries major risks. Through the introduction of genetically modified organisms, horizontal 
genetic drift may occur and, armed with new genes captured from modified organisms (genes that 
thus migrate from species to species), new and lethal pathogens may appear. Alternatively, existing 
pathogens may opportunistically colonise hitherto unavailable ecological space from which our 
intervention excludes their up-till-now dominant rivals. Emergent and unexpected new qualities of 
crops as well as dairy and meat products may include toxicity or being allergenic for humans consuming 
them. In the meantime, precious biodiversity is lost, which may increase humanity’s vulnerability along 
with its dependence on the new plant and animal variants, should new pathogens successfully attack 
these.11 
Further problems arise from the complex social, economic and political environment in which synthetic 
biology’s achievements are introduced.  
The weaponisation of biology. Bioterrorists may seek to synthesise viruses and other pathogens based 
on genomes for which they are able to obtain their exact genetic codes, perhaps from darknet sites 
that share them for just this purpose, or actors that look to commercialise this information, with their 
services paid in cryptocurrencies. 
That bioweapons per rule lead to uncontrollable or difficult-to-control collateral damage would not 
necessarily hold bioterrorists back: non-state actors such as the Rajneesh sect in the US or the Aum 
Shinrikyo sect in Japan have in the past carried out or attempted attacks using various pathogens. In 
fact, future advances may make the targeting of bioweapons much more precise, for instance with 
genetically targeted weapons developed against specific ethnicities. Genetic ancestry testing is now a 
widely available service that identifies with great accuracy the ethnic backgrounds of one’s pool of 
ancestors. So-called single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), that is, genome variations specific to 
people of a common background, may make it possible to target people with a certain dominant 
ethnicity on the basis of a much larger dataset now, with differences increasingly clearly mapped out. 
Once targeting is possible, states will have a changed set of incentives for the development and use of 
bioweapons, too. Past biological weapons programmes (before the Biological Weapons Convention of 
1972) often focused on limiting lethality, aspiring only to make available the means of rendering an 
enemy army unable to fight, and not necessarily to kill its soldiers, in part because of concerns over 
possible blowback. Better-targeted weapons may neutralise such considerations, even as blowback 
will always remain a possibility when a pathogen is released into the wild.  
Resistant pathogens. Growing Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR) to drugs and treatments renders 
making new classes of drugs available an existential imperative for humanity, but the manipulation of 
the genome of various organisations may itself contribute to the emergence of multiresistant bacteria 
and also viruses that are able to get around interferon treatment. 
Unsafe health data. A lot of health data will be generated by future research and in the process of the 
medical use of its results. The trend is already pointing towards increasing digitalisation in this field, 
which – according to current hopes – should make relevant medical data accessible and possible to 
share for both patients and doctors in a timely manner, for example across the EU Single Market. There 
will be efforts to preserve security and privacy, of course. But with the characteristics of cyberspace in 
mind – where offense dominance means that defenders not only cannot have a perfect defence against 
all conceivable attacks, but will usually find out about attacks only after the integrity of their data has 
already been compromised – the most sensible assumption is that a lot of health data being accessible, 
even when they are stored behind firewalls of various kinds, means a lot of health data being hacked, 
ultimately. 
“Hacked” can mean stolen as well as erased, rendered inaccessible or manipulated. Ransomware 
developers have already sought with success to exploit the vulnerabilities of health data.12 In a future 
where every individual’s genome may be mapped and treatments may be personalised or tailor-made 
with a view to an individual’s specific traits, data manipulation (especially when it is not discovered) 
could pose a new type of threat.  
A rigid application of distorted market mechanisms for the fruits of biotechnology. Patents and 
intellectual property rights will continue to increase the rigidity with which biotechnological 
innovations can be marketed and used in a world that will be increasingly dependent on these. The 
documentary titled The Patent Wars (2014) spectacularly captured this trend, and it is noteworthy that 
there is, even at the time of writing this, a protracted legal battle over patent rights to the 
aforementioned CRISPR/Cas9 technology of genetic engineering. But patent wars in fact extend far 
beyond technological innovations, and there is a fight for patent rights to the genetic codes of modified 
organisms, including, prospectively, that of humans. A 2013 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that natural DNA cannot be patented, and this is absolutely welcome in that it clears the road to the 
development of genomic medicine. At the same time, however, it boosts the race for achieving 
breakthroughs in developing synthetic DNA (cDNA).13 
This brings us to a further key consideration: the role of inequalities. 
Inequalities. Most of the world’s economic activity as such is embedded today in an only partially free 
market economy. Transnational oligopolies emerge, market failures occur, and, even as this unfolds, 
there is little in the way of limitations to the degree to which the provision of health benefits can be 
commercialised and, per consequence, withheld, based on the absence of purchasing power. The 
biotechnological revolution may thus create a world of hitherto unimaginable inequalities where 
human being to human being may ultimately compare like God to an ape. 
It is the idea of just this kind of world that is long since being probed by science fiction. With the realms 
of the possible and the plausible expanding by the moment, it is ultimately in this literature and its 
scenarios that one may come across useful hints as to what may – or perhaps should – be expected.  
The answer regarding the question in the title is not entirely reassuring. Humanity is certainly capable 
of coming up with intelligent innovations. It is fairness that has traditionally been the greater challenge 
in terms of how society organises itself – upon the application of new technologies. 
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